UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

8-19-2013

State v. Brown Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40545

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Brown Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40545" (2013). Not Reported. 1206.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1206

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
ERIC LAWDAHL BROWN, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.

__________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

OPY

No. 40545
Kootenai Co. Case No.
CR-2011-18678

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

HONORABLE LANSING L. HAYNES
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
DAPHNE J. HUANG
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

~COPY
AUG 19 2013

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ................................................................................ 1
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings ................................... 1
ISSUES .......................................................................................................... 3
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 4
I.

II.

Brown Has Failed To Show A Right To Review
Of The Idaho Supreme Court's Order Denying
His Motion To Augment In Which, In Any Event,
The Court Properly Found Brown Was Not Denied
Due Process Or Equal Protection Rights ................................... 4

A

The Idaho Court Of Appeals Lacks Authority
To Review The Idaho Supreme Court's
Decision Denying The Motion To Augment. .................... 4

B.

The Supreme Court Properly Denied Brown's
Initial Motion .................................................................... 5

Brown Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused
Its Discretion In Not Sua Sponte Reducing His Sentence,
Given His Admitted Probation Violations And Failure
To Comply With Court-Ordered Conditions Or The Law ............ 8

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 11
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................ 11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGE

Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367 (Ct. App. 2001) ................................................ 6
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585 (1956) ............................................... 8
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102,117 S.Ct. 555 (1996) ........................................... 8
State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053 (Ct. App. 1989) ................................................. 6
State v. Cornelison, 2013 WL 1613842 (Ct. App. 2013) ...................................... 5
State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 267 P.3d 709 (2011) .......................................... 9
State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) ................................................... 6
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 218 P.3d 5 (Ct. App. 2009) ............................ 5
State v. Hayes, 138 Idaho 761, 69 P.3d 181 (Ct. App. 2003) ............................ 10
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 264 P.3d 935 (2011) ...................................... 9, 11
State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 288 P.3d 835 (Ct. App. 2012) .................. 4, 5, 6
State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900 (1983) ................................................................... 6
State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) ................................................................. 6
State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873,253 P.3d 310 (2011) ............................. 8, 9, 11

RULES
I.A.R. 28(a) ........................................................................................................... 5

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Eric Brown appeals from the district court's orders revoking probation and
executing his sentence for possessing a controlled substance, driving under the
influence, and attempting to elude. Brown argues the court abused its discretion
in not sua sponte reducing his sentence.

Brown also challenges the Idaho

Supreme Court's order denying his motion to augment the record to include
transcripts from various proceedings.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Eric Brown pleaded guilty to possessing a controlled substance, driving
under the influence, and attempting to elude. (R., pp. 22-23.) The district court
sentenced Brown to a term of four years with two years fixed, but retained
jurisdiction

and

recommended

placement in the Correctional Alternative

Placement Program (CAPP). The district court suspended execution of Brown's
sentence and placed Brown on supervised probation, subject to conditions. (R.,
pp. 41-45.)
Eleven days later, Brown's probation officer filed a Report of Probation
Violation (PSI, pp. 47-53.) The report alleged six violations, including failing to
check in for his week of discretionary jail time, moving without permission, failing
to report or appear for probation appointments, using marijuana, and absconding
probation.

(Id.) An addendum to the report, filed a month later, alleged two

additional violations, committing the crimes of carrying a concealed weapon, and
possessing paraphernalia. (PSI, pp. 55-56.)
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After Brown admitted violating his probation, the district court entered
judgment on the probation violation, revoking probation and executing sentence.
(R., pp. 49-52.)

In its order, the district court recommended that Brown be

allowed to participate in the Therapeutic Community or any substance abuse
treatment or counseling available through the Department of Correction while
incarcerated. (R., p. 52.) Brown timely appealed. (R., p. 54.)

2

ISSUES
Brown states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Brown due process
and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment
with transcripts necessary for review of the issues on
appeal?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to
reduce Mr. Brown's sentence sua sponte upon revoking
probation?

(Appellant's brief, p. 3.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Brown failed to show a right to review of the Idaho Supreme Court's
order denying his motion to augment in which, in any event, the Court
properly found Brown was not denied due process or equal protection
rights?

2.

Has Brown failed to show the district court abused its discretion in not sua
sponte reducing his sentence, given his admitted probation violations and
failure to comply with court-ordered conditions or the law?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Brown Has Failed To Show A Right To Review Of The Idaho Supreme Court's
Order Denying His Motion To Augment In Which, In Any Event, The Court
Properly Found Brown Was Not Denied Due Process
Or Equal Protection Rights
A.

The Idaho Court Of Appeals Lacks Authority To Review The Idaho
Supreme Court's Decision Denying The Motion To Augment
On appeal, Brown requested transcripts from his December 2011 plea

hearing, February 2012 sentencing hearing, June 2012 rider review hearing, and
September 2012 admit/deny hearing.

(3/22/13 Motion.)

The Idaho Supreme

Court denied the motion as to all but the September 2012 hearing transcript.
(4/15/13 Order.) In his brief on appeal, Brown argues that the Court's denial of
augmentation with these transcripts violates his right to due process and equal
protection.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 5-20.)

As an initial matter, if this case is

assigned to the Idaho Court of Appeals, there is no authority to review the Idaho
Supreme Court's decision under Idaho case law.
The Idaho Court of Appeals cannot directly review a decision of the Idaho
Supreme Court. Rather, it may only grant an independent motion based on new
information "or a new or expanded basis for the motion." State v. Morgan, 153
Idaho 618, _, 288 P.3d 835, 837 (Ct. App. 2012). Brown makes clear here that
he is not renewing his motion, but seeks review of the Idaho Supreme Court's
denial of the initial motion. (Appellant's brief, p. 4.) Brown has identified no legal
authority allowing such review by the Idaho Court of Appeals. The Idaho Court of
Appeals recently rejected an appellant's attempt to seek review of the Idaho
Supreme Court's denial of a nearly identical issue in State v. Cornelison, 2013
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WL 1613842 (Ct. App. 2013). If this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals,
existing case law supports rejection of Brown's argument.
B.

The Supreme Court Properly Denied Brown's Initial Motion
Even if the Court were to entertain Brown's request for review, Brown has

failed to show a legal basis to reverse the Court's decision denying the motion.
Under Idaho case law, Brown's due process and equal protection rights were not
violated.
A defendant is denied due process or equal protection if he has been
denied "a record on appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the
errors alleged regarding the proceedings below." Morgan, 153 Idaho at_, 288
P.3d at 838 (citations omitted). Although the record on appeal is not confined to
those facts arising between sentencing and the probation revocation appealed,
id. (citing State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009)), it
need not include "a// proceedings in the trial court up to and including
sentencing." Id. (emphasis original).

Rather, the appellate court will consider

those elements of the trial court record relevant to the probation revocation
issues and that are properly part of the appellate record. l.Q.,_
The appellate rules designating those records necessary for appellate
review afford all process due an appellant. l.Q.,_ at 838-39 (citing I.AR. 28(a),
29(a), 30). The fact that the appellate court denies an appellant's motion to
augment does not show a violation of due process. Under Morgan, the appellate
court need only admit those parts of the record below that were germane to the
trial court's probation revocation decision.
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!Q.

Specifically, the Morgan court

said, "This Court will not assume the omitted transcripts would support the
district court's revocation order since they were not before the district court in the
[final] probation violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication
that it based its revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those
prior hearings." J_g. at 838.
Brown notes that, unlike in Morgan, Brown challenges his sentence, rather
than the order revoking his probation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11.) On this
distinction, Brown argues, "the entire record encompassing events before and
after original judgment" is needed for his appeal. (Appellant's brief, p. 11.) Thus
Brown asserts that where sentencing is challenged on appeal, the entire record
of proceedings is relevant as a matter of law.

The Morgan court explicitly

rejected such a proposition. Morgan, 153 Idaho at _, 288 P.3d at 838. And
importantly, nothing in Morgan indicates its holding applies to appeals of
probation revocations, but not to appeals from sentencing.
Arguing that the requested transcripts are relevant, Brown cites Idaho
cases holding that a court is entitled to use knowledge learned from its official
position and observations in imposing sentence. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 12131 .) Brown asserts that, because the court can use information learned in prior
proceedings when sentencing a defendant, transcripts of those proceedings are
relevant. But the mere assertion that the transcripts are relevant does not make

Citing Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Sivak,
105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977); State v.
Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 105556 (Ct. App. 1989).
1
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them so. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 9-16.) Ultimately, Brown fails to provide a
legal basis for his proposition, but only makes self-serving conclusory assertions.
Nor has Brown provided a factual basis for his argument. As in Morgan,
the district court here gave no indication that its decision revoking Brown's
probation and imposing his sentence was based on information provided in prior
hearings but

not provided in his final disposition hearing. (See 10/19/12 Tr.)

The transcript reflects instead that the court revoked Brown's probation based on
information before the court for the final hearing. (10/19/12 Tr., p. 7, L. 22 - p.
11, L. 16)
The district court's statement to Brown in his disposition hearing was
thorough and thoughtful, covering Brown's criminal history, as well as the court's
memory of Brown's improved demeanor at the June 2012 hearing, then his
almost immediate probation violations thereafter. (10/19/12 Tr., p. 7, L. 24 - p.
10, L. 23.) Brown has failed to show a factual basis why the transcripts from his
December 2011 plea hearing, February 2012 sentencing hearing, and June 2012
rider review hearing would be in any way relevant on this appeal.
Absent demonstration that the transcripts are factually or legally relevant,
Brown cannot show that counsel's ability to provide effective assistance is
hindered by the Court's denial of augmentation to include the transcripts in the
appellate record. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 16-18.) Accordingly, Brown cannot
show that denial of augmentation with the requested transcripts violates his right
to due process.
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Regarding Brown's equal protection claim, the U.S. Supreme Court has
held that the "[d]estitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate
review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts."

Griffin v.

Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19, 76 S.Ct. 585, 591 (1956). However, the state need only
provide "adequate and effective appellate review," or those portions of the record
necessary to pursue the issues raised on appeal. Id. at 20, 76 S.Ct. at 591. An
indigent appellant has a right to "a transcript of relevant trial proceedings," or a
record "complete enough to allow fair appellate consideration of his claims."
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 121-23, 117 S.Ct. 555, 566-67 (1996).
Because Brown has not demonstrated that the transcripts are relevant to
the issues here, he also fails to show they are needed for adequate and effective
appellate review.

Accordingly, this Court should find that its initial denial of

Brown's motion was correct.

11.
Brown Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Not Sua
Sponte Reducing His Sentence, Given His Admitted Probation Violations And
Failure To Comply With Court-Ordered Conditions Or The Law
The appellate court will not disturb a sentence that is within statutory limits
absent a clear showing of abuse. State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 253
P.3d 310, 312 (2011) (citation omitted).

Brown does not dispute that his

sentence was within statutory limits. (Appellant's brief, p. 19.) In reviewing for
abuse of discretion, the appellate court considers whether the district court (1)
was aware its decision was discretionary, (2) acted within the scope of its
discretion and consistent with applicable law, and (3) reached its decision
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through exercise of reason. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935,
941 (2011).
To meet his burden on appeal, Brown must show his sentence is
excessive "under any reasonable view of the facts," considering the objectives of
criminal punishment: protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and
retribution. Windom, 150 Idaho at 876, 253 P.3d at 313.

In reviewing an

excessive sentence claim, the appellate court independently reviews the record,
examining the nature of the offense, and the offender's character.

State v.

Delling, 152 Idaho 122,132,267 P.3d 709,719 (2011) (citation omitted). Where
reasonable minds could differ as to whether a sentence is excessive, the
appellate court will not disturb it.

Miller, 151 Idaho at 834, 264 P.3d at 941

(citation omitted).
Brown cites, as mitigating factors, his young age, his childhood lack of
supervision and physical abuse by his father, and his substance abuse and
mental health problems. (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-20.) These considerations fail
to demonstrate that the district court's view of the facts was unreasonable, or
that its sentence was excessive. The district court acknowledged the apparent
progress that Brown had made between his initial sentencing hearing and the
rider review. (1019/12 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 5-18.) However, the district court went on to
note that Brown "barely got out of the courtroom doors before he went off with
friends smoking marijuana to, quote, celebrate his release from his rider program
.... " (10/19/12 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 22-25.)
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The probation officer then gave Brown a chance to correct his misstep
with "seven days of unscheduled jail time for that just gross violation of
probation," rather than bringing Brown back to court. (10/19/12 Tr., p. 9, L. 25 p. 10, L. 3.) Brown responded by failing to show up for the jail time, then twice
more failing to report to the probation officer. (10/19 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 5-14; PSI, pp.
47-49.)

As the district court said at Brown's sentencing on the probation

violations, "within a month of being placed out on [Brown's] probation period he
more or less absconded from his probation." (10/19/12 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 18-20.)
And the following month, Brown committed new offenses of carrying a concealed
weapon without a license and possessing drug paraphernalia. (10/19/12 Tr., p.
10, Ls. 21-23; PSI, pp. 55-56.)
The district court noted that the primary consideration in sentencing is
protection of society.

(10/19/12 Tr., p. 10, L. 24 - p. 11, L. 1.) See State v.

Hayes, 138 Idaho 761, 766, 69 P.3d 181, 186 (Ct. App. 2003). The district court
expressed, "It is this Court's opinion that society is not adequately protected with
a probation period." (10/19/12 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 1-3.) Further, given the limited
space in the retained jurisdiction program, the district court determined the
program was best reserved "for those individuals who are demonstrating at least
some indications of being serious about rehabilitation." (10/19/12 Tr., p. 11, Ls.
6-16.)
The district court's findings are amply supported, given Brown's admitted
behavior and refusal to comply following his rider review hearing.

Even if this

Court disagrees with the district court's view of the facts, those findings must not
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be undisturbed. Miller, 151 Idaho at 834, 264 P.3d at 941. The district court
acted well within its discretion in executing the previously imposed sentence of
four years with two years fixed, and recommending treatment and counseling
programs available through the Department of Corrections. Accordingly, Brown
has failed to show his sentence is excessive "under any reasonable view of the
facts." See Windom, 150 Idaho at 876, 253 P.3d at 313.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order imposing sentence, and the Supreme Court's order denying Brown's
motion to augment.
DATED this 19th day of August, 2013.
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Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of August, 2013, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
SHAWN F. WILKERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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